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Abstract 
 
To this day, no adequate solution has been found for measuring the strength of executives in political science. Despite the 
widespread use of several methods for measuring presidential powers, critical investigation of these methods still needs to be 
conducted. The author analyzes methods that have been established by Shugart and Carey, by Frye, McGregor, Hellman, 
Krouwel, Siaroff, Johannsen and Nørgaard among others. When discussing mistakes in the measurement of presidential 
powers (e.g., where authors fail to consider the informal powers of presidents, where measurements are based on a 
constitution and not on political practice, and where authors do not differentiate between significant and insignificant powers), 
the author tries to remove some of the problems of measurement. He modifies Krouwel’s method based on measuring the 
presidential score and parliamentary score that allows us to “weigh” the presidential and parliamentary components of any form 
of government, whether presidential, parliamentary, or semi-presidential. He suggests a method of measuring based on the 
calculation of the index of the form of government (IFG), which is calculated by subtracting the parliamentary score from the 
presidential score. A positive IFG indicates the attraction of a system to presidentialism, and negative its shift to 
parliamentarism. This methodology is sensitive to post-communist realities and countries with informal politics. On calculating 
the IFG for the post-communist states, the author specifies clusters of such systems (presidentialized, balanced, 
parliamentarized) and shows the importance of measuring forms of government in contemporary political studies. 
 
Keywords: presidential power; measuring presidential power; quantitative methods; form of government; presidentialism; post-
communist presidencies  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, political scientists have widely adopted measurement of presidential power (Zaznaev, 2014a). There are 
now several methods of measuring that allow to imagine numerically not only the power of actors, but also the nature of 
the form of government. To this day, no satisfactory solution has been found for measuring the strength of executives. 
The objective of this article is a critical investigation of these methods and a search for an adequate method that may be 
used in the study of post-communist countries. Measuring forms of government in countries of this area helps to gain 
knowledge about the volume of presidential, parliamentary and governmental powers in post-communist countries by 
empirical way, to solve different tasks, for example, to classify regimes and to determine relationship between 
presidentialism and democracy.  
 
2. Research Problems in the Measurement of Presidential Powers  
 
A. The list of presidential powers for measurement is too long. For example, J. McGregor’s (1994) proposed a list 
comprising 43 presidential powers. He divided them into three groups: a) symbolic, ceremonial, and procedural; b) 
appointive; and c) political (pp. 12–16). J. Fortin (2013) rightly concentrated only on six presidential powers: package 
veto, partial veto, exclusive introduction of legislation, cabinet dismissal, cabinet formation, censure (pp. 105–106). These 
elements should be measured by a researcher. Fortin came from the fact that a president is not considered 
constitutionally powerful “based on his or her holding a myriad of powers (the more items, the more powerful)”; rather, he 
or she holds a set of key, and universal, central powers (p. 106). If we focus on the main elements of presidential power, 
we receive equivalent and common indicators for all countries, which allow us to compare them.  
B. Authors do not differentiate between significant and insignificant powers of presidents. Shugart and Carey 
(1992) used “a simple interval scoring method on each of several aspects in which systems with elected presidencies 
                                                                            
1 This article is based on the author’s paper presented at the International Political Science Association 23rd World Congress, Montreal, 
19-24 July, 2014. 
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vary” (p. 148) and divided all powers into two groups – legislative and nonlegislative (pp. 148–166). McGregor rightly took 
into account the “weight” of different groups of powers: appointive powers are twice as important as symbolic, ceremonial, 
and procedural powers, and political powers are three times as important (p. 10). This is true because, for example, 
awarding decorations, titles, and honors are not tantamount to the appointment of a prime minister or proposing 
legislation.  
C. Measurements are based on a constitution and not on political practice (in the most works). M.S. Shugart and 
J.M. Carey (1992) focused only on the formal presidential prerogatives, such as those included in the constitution, and 
did not consider the political practice and the real (not formal) frameworks of power. In my view, this is the defect in their 
method. A. Siaroff (2003) measured not only the formal but also the informal powers of the president, which thereby 
makes his method real. He offered a dichotomous indexing system (“1” – yes, “0” – no) and reduced the number of 
variables to nine (pp. 303–305). Noteworthy here is that two variables in his list (direct election of the president and 
simultaneous elections for president and legislature) characterize the form of government rather than the actual powers of 
the president.  
D. Authors fail to consider the informal powers of presidents. T. Frye’s (1997) method involved dividing the formal 
powers of the presidency into two groups: the powers “owned” only by the president and those that he performed 
together with the parliament or the government (shared powers). If the president is elected in a general election, each 
exclusive power is assigned a value of “1,” and each joint power receives “0.5.” If not elected in this way, all powers 
receive “0.5.” All of the numerical values are then summed (pp. 525–526). Formal and informal institutions were the focus 
of L. Johannsen and O. Nørgaard (2003). They offered the so-called Index of Presidential Authority (IPA), which is 
constructed using three main constitutional power resources – symbolic, appointive, and political. In addition, the IPA 
seeks to account for the method of presidential election (direct or indirect) and length of presidential term. The president 
can either possess a power in full (coding “1”), in a qualified form (coding “1/2”), or not at all (coding “0”) (p. 6). 
Calculation of the IPA is by way of a specially drawn up formula. To what extent does the index of presidential power 
depend on the president’s personality, and what differences are there between indexes of presidential power, for 
example, in Russia under Putin or Medvedev. We should consider the formal prerogatives of presidents or informal 
aspects of presidential authority. So is it necessary to seek the assistance of experts who could say about informal 
powers. But this is increasing the risk of unreliability. 
E. J. Hellman (1996) coded the formal constitutional powers of the president depending on the type of regime: in 
presidential systems each exclusive presidential power received “1,” a power with reservations “0.5,” and not given “0”; in 
parliamentary systems with direct presidential elections “0.75,” “0.35,” and “0” respectively; and in parliamentary systems 
with indirect presidential elections “0.5,” “0.25,” and “0”. She explained these differences in coding by the fact that in 
different institutional structures presidential powers have a different weight. But the question should be addressed: how to 
compare presidential prerogatives between different regimes? I think that we should not take into account the 
particularities of presidential, parliamentary, and semi-presidential regimes in the measurement.  
F. Most authors measure the most likely the president’s powers, not form of government. A. Siaroff (2003) and A. 
Krouwel (2003) tried to measure form of government. Noteworthy here is that two variables in Siaroff’s list (direct election 
of the president and simultaneous elections for president and legislature) characterize the form of government rather than 
the actual powers of the president. A. Krouwel (2003) identified “the core elements of presidentialism,” rather than 
including all powers and prerogatives of the president (p. 6).  
How to remove the problems of measurement? I suggest the method that helps us with this. First of all, I would like 
to turn to Krouwel’s method.  
 
3. Krouwel’s Method of Measurement 
 
The method of measurement developed by Krouwel (2003) is, in my view, the most interesting and fruitful. He goes 
beyond mere analysis of presidential powers to include the “systematic characteristics of political systems as a whole” (p. 
6), and sees his task as determining the level of presidentialism instead of a mere measurement of presidential 
prerogatives. Krouwel adopts a two-dimensional approach (pure presidentialism and pure parliamentarism) and offers a 
new method based on measuring the presidential score and parliamentary score. He codes the following seven 
constitutional elements: election of the head of state; dissolution of parliament; ministerial appointments; vote of 
investiture before a government takes office; vote of confidence; introduction and veto of legislation; and executive 
powers. In calculating the presidential score, each variable associated with presidentialism receives the score “1,” and 
each variable that is not a characteristic of presidentialism receives the score “0”; when the powers are shared or limited 
the score is “0.5” (pp. 16–17). The presidential score is the sum of the scores for all seven variables of presidentialism, 
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and the parliamentary score is the sum of the scores for all seven variables of parliamentarism. The level of 
presidentialism is then calculated by subtracting the parliamentary score from the presidential score. A positive score 
indicates presidentialism, a negative score indicates parliamentarism, and the higher the score, the higher the level of 
presidentialism (p. 9). For example, according to Krouwel, the level of presidentialism for Russia is “+4.5,” for Lithuania 
“+0.5,” for Poland “0.0,” for Romania “-2.0,” and for the Czech Republic “-4.5.”  
Krouwel’s method is valuable because it allows us to “weigh” the presidential and parliamentary components of 
any form of government, whether presidential, parliamentary, or semi-presidential. However, it requires modification. 
 
4. The Modification of Krouwel’s Method of Measurement 
 
In particular, I have amended several variables (Zaznaev, 2006; Zaznaev, 2007). I have divided the variable “ministerial 
appointment” into “appointment of prime minister” and “appointment of ministers,” divided “introduction and veto of 
legislation” into “introduction of legislation” and “veto of legislation,” and have excluded Krouwel’s “vote of confidence.” 
Finally, I have added two new variables: “compatibility/incompatibility of the position of member of legislature with the 
government position” and “formation of a new cabinet after the presidential and (or) the parliamentary elections.” I 
eventually proposed ten criteria for measuring different systems, whether presidentialism, parliamentarism, semi-
presidentialism, or any other (Zaznaev, 2006, pp. 192–193). As with Krouwel’s method, the maximum value for each of 
the 10 criteria is “1,” the minimum is “0,” and there is the intermediate variant “0.5.” Easy to calculate by summing all 10 
criterions, the maximum presidential score (PresS) and parliamentary score (ParlS) may be 10 (Zaznaev, 2014a).  
 
Table 1: The parliamentary and presidential scores 
 
 Criteria Presidential score Parliamentary score 
A Election of the head of state 1 – election of the head of state by the people 
0.5 – where only one candidate is nominated, he or 
she is deemed elected without the need for a ballot 
0 – the head of state is not elected by the people 
1 – the head of state is elected by parliament or 
a special electoral college, or he or she inherits 
the post 
0.5 – where only one candidate is nominated, 
he or she is deemed elected without the need 
for a ballot 
0 – the head of state is elected by the people 
B The executive 1 – the head of state/the president holds the 
executive powers and heads the cabinet (the 
president’s administration) 
0.5 – the head of state/the president shares 
executive powers with the government 
0 – the head of state/the president has no executive 
powers 
1 – the executive is the government responsible 
to parliament 
0.5 – the executive powers are shared between 
the head of state/the president and the 
government 
0 – the government is fully responsible to the 
head of state/the president 
C Appointment of prime minister 1 – the head of state/the president appoints the 
prime minister (or the head of state/the president 
executes functions of the prime minister) 
0.5 – the head of state/the president shares the 
power to appoint the prime minister with parliament 
(the coordinated appointment) 
0 – the head of state/the president does not affect 
the appointment of the prime minister (or the head of 
state/the president is forced to consider the party 
composition of parliament when appointing the prime 
minister) 
1 – the prime minister is appointed by 
parliament or the head of state/president who is 
forced to consider the party composition of 
parliament 
0.5 – parliament shares the power to appoint 
the prime minister with the head of state/the 
president (the coordinated appointment) 
0 – parliament has no power to influence the 
appointment of the prime minister 
D Appointment of ministers 1 – the head of state/the president alone appoints 
ministers 
0.5 – the head of state/the president shares the 
prerogative to appoint ministers with the prime 
minister and/or parliament (the coordinated 
appointment) 
0 – the head of state/the president does not affect 
the appointment of ministers (or the head of state/the 
president is forced to consider the opinion of 
parliament and/or the prime minister) 
1 – the appointment of ministers is the 
prerogative of parliament and/or the prime 
minister 
0.5 – parliament (the prime minister) shares the 
prerogative to appoint ministers with the head 
of state/the president (the coordinated 
appointment) 
0 – parliament has no power to influence the 
cabinet portfolio allocation 
 
E Formation of a new cabinet after… 1 – the presidential election 
0.5 – the presidential and the parliamentary elections
0 – the parliamentary election 
1 – the parliamentary election 
0.5 – the presidential and the parliamentary 
elections 
0 – the presidential election 
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F Vote of no confidence 1 – a vote of no confidence can be ignored by the 
head of state/the president and the government 
0.5 – a vote of no confidence always results in the 
resignation of the government or the dissolution of 
parliament 
 
0 – a vote of no confidence always results in the 
resignation of the government 
(parliament cannot be dissolved in response to a no-
confidence vote) 
1 – a vote of no confidence always results in 
the resignation of the government 
(parliament cannot be dissolved in response to 
a no-confidence vote) 
0.5 – a vote of no confidence always results in 
the resignation of the government or the 
dissolution of parliament 
0 – a vote of no confidence can be ignored by 
the head of state/president and the government 
G Introduction of legislation 1 – the head of state/the president has the right to 
propose legislation, along with parliament (individual 
MPs, parliamentary groups) and the government 
0.5 – the right to propose legislation is vested with 
the head of state/president, parliament, the 
government, and other actors (judges, electorate 
etc.) 
0 – the head of state/the president has no right to 
propose legislation 
1 – the right to propose legislation is only 
vested with parliament (individual MPs, 
parliamentary groups) and the government 
0.5 – the head of state/the president and other 
actors (judges, electorate etc.) have the right to 
propose legislation, along with parliament and 
the government 
0 – the head of state/the president has the right 
to propose legislation, along with parliament 
(individual MPs, parliamentary groups) and the 
government 
H Veto of legislation 1 – a qualified majority (2/3; 3/4; 3/5; 4/5) in 
parliament is required to override a veto of the head 
of state/the president 
0.5 – a qualified or simple majority vote in parliament 
may override a veto of legislation 
0 – there is no veto of the head of state/the 
president, or despite rejection of a bill put forward by 
the head of state/the president, it enters into force 
(and then this bill is passed by referendum) 
1 – there is no veto of the head of state/the 
president, or despite rejection of a bill put 
forward by the head of state/the president, it 
enters into force (and then this bill is passed by 
referendum) 
0.5 –a qualified or simple majority vote in 
parliament may override a veto of legislation 
0 – a qualified majority (2/3; 3/4; 3/5; 4/5) in 
parliament is required to override a veto of the 
head of state/the president 
I Dissolution of parliament 1 – it is the sole prerogative of the head of state/the 
president to dissolve parliament 
0.5 – the head of state/the president dissolves 
parliament, but initiated by other actors (the prime 
minister, parliament etc.) 
0 – the head of state/the president has no formal 
powers to dissolve parliament 
1 – the head of state/the president has no 
formal powers to dissolve parliament 
0.5 – the head of state/the president dissolves 
parliament, but initiated by other actors (the 
prime minister, parliament etc.) 
0 – it is the sole prerogative of the head of 
state/the president to dissolve parliament 
J Compatibility/incompatibility of the 
position of member of legislature with 
the government position 
1 – incompatible 
0.5 – compatible for members of one chamber of 
parliament and incompatible for members of another 
chamber 
0 – compatible 
1 – compatible 
0.5 – compatible for members of one chamber 
of parliament and incompatible for members of 
another chamber 
0 – incompatible 
 
I suggest that my method of measuring is based on the calculation of the index of the form of government (IFG), which is 
calculated by subtracting the parliamentary score from the presidential score: 
IFG = PresS – ParlS. 
A positive IFG indicates the attraction of a system to presidentialism, and negative its shift to parliamentarism. The 
higher the numerical value of the index, the greater the presidential elements in a system, the lower the more 
parliamentary. A zero IFG shows a balance of power. All states are placed on a scale of “-10” to “+10.” Therefore, 
calculating IFG provides opportunities not only for a more accurate estimation of separate systems, but also for 
comparing them (Zaznaev, 2007, pp. 162–164).  
Based on this modified methodology, I calculated the IFG of post-Soviet countries.  
 
Table 2: IFG of post-Soviet countries 
 
 Country Presidential score Parliamentary score IFG 
1 Armenia 4,5 5,5 –1 
2 Azerbaijan 8 2 +6 
3 Belarus 8,5 1,5 +7 
4 Estonia 2 8 –6 
5 Georgia 7,5 2,5 +5 
5 Kazakhstan 9,5 0,5 +9 
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7 Kyrgyzstan 7 3 +4 
8 Latvia 2 8 –6 
9 Lithuania 4 6 –2 
10 Moldova 2,5 7,5 –5 
11 Russia 9 1 +8 
12 Tajikistan 8,5 1,5 +7 
13 Turkmenistan 9,5 0,5 +9 
14 Ukraine 5 5 0 
15 Uzbekistan 8,5 1,5 +7 
 
5. Measuring Forms of Government in Post-Communist Countries: Pluses of the Modified Krouwel’s Method 
 
This method is chosen for the analysis of post-communist world because it is sensitive to realities of these countries.  
1. It allows to “weigh” the presidential and parliamentary components of any form of government, whether 
presidential, parliamentary, or semi-presidential. There is the discussion about forms of government on the 
post-Soviet space. Using the above-mentioned method, we measure and do not think about the type of 
government.  
2. We can take into account informal politics and informal characteristic of regimes. If we use assessment, we 
create two tables – formal and informal, for example, in Russia as shown in table 3.  
 
Table 3: Presidential and parliamentary scores in Russia 
 
Criteria Presidential score Parliamentary score Constitution In practice Constitution In practice 
1 Election of the head of state 1 1 0 0 
2 The executive 0 0,5 1 0,5 
3 Appointment of prime minister 0,5 1 0,5 0 
4 Appointment of ministers 0,5 1 0,5 0 
5 Formation of a new cabinet after the presidential or (and) the parliamentary elections 1 1 0 0 
6 Vote of no confidence 1 1 0 0 
7 Introduction of legislation 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 
8 Veto of legislation 1 1 0 0 
9 Dissolution of parliament 1 1 0 0 
10 Compatibility/incompatibility of the position of member of legislature with the government position 1 1 0 0 
In total 7,5 9 2,5 1 
 
 
IFG Constitution = +5
IFG In practice = +8 
 
3. We focus on the main elements of forms of government, rather than including all powers of the president and 
other actors. This allows us to receive equivalent and common indicators for all countries, which allow us to 
compare them. 
4. This method is clear, simple, and easy to use: there are only 10 criteria and long scale (from –10 to +10).  
Measuring forms of government in post-communist countries has a lot of pluses. First of all, it allows us to compare 
the “strength” and “weakness” of the presidential and parliamentary authority. In particular, we can empirically confirm or 
refute the common idea of the super-strong power of the president (“super-presidentialism”) in, for example, countries of 
the former Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe. In addition, a quantitative method may help researchers to 
suggest options for political reform in these states.  
Measuring presidential power allows us to develop a comprehensive typology of regimes, and to draw clear 
boundaries between presidentialism, parliamentarism, semi-presidentialism, and other types. Measuring presidential 
power allowed me to specify 7 clusters of systems: super-presidential, presidential, presidentialized, balanced, 
parliamentarized, parliamentary, and super-parliamentary.  
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Table 4: Clusters of systems 
 
+ 10
+ 9 
+ 8 
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan 
Kazakhstan Russia 
super-presidential
+ 7
+ 6 
+ 5 
Belarus Tajikistan
Azerbaijan 
Georgia 
presidential
+ 4
+ 3 
+ 2 
Kyrgyzstan presidentialized
+ 1
0 
– 1 
Armenia Ukraine balanced
– 2
– 3 
– 4 
Lithuania
Moldova 
parliamentarized
– 5
– 6 
– 7 
Estonia Latvia parliamentary
– 8
– 9 
– 10 
super-parliamentary
 
Measuring presidential power provides the ability to track the dynamics of regimes. Focusing on qualitative categories 
(presidentialism, parliamentarism, semi-presidentialism etc.) means it is extremely difficult to determine in which direction 
the regime moves. For example, there are difficulties in trying to determine how the form of government in Kyrgyzstan 
has changed following the “Tulip Revolution” in 2006–2007: Kyrgyzstan under Askar Akayev was semi-presidential, and 
after he was overthrown it has become semi-presidential once again. However, there is no doubt that the relationship 
between the president, government, and parliament has changed, which can be determined using quantitative methods. 
 
Table 5: Dynamics of IFG of post-Soviet countries 
  
+9 Kazakhstan (before 2007)
+8 Kazakhstan (2007) Kyrgyzstan (first reform, forth reform)
+6 Georgia (before 2004)
+5 Georgia (2004) Kyrgyzstan (fifth reform)
+4 Kyrgyzstan (second reform, third reform) Ukraine (before 2004)
+3 Ⱥɪɦɟɧɢɹ (before 2005)
0 Ukraine (2004)
–1 Armenia (2005)
 
If you look at the constitutional development of states of Europe and the former Soviet Union in recent years, it is easy to 
distinguish two trends in dynamics – parliamentarization (Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine) and 
presidentialization (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia etc.). It is possible to search these trends using measurement.  
The index of presidential power opens up opportunities for determination of the relationship between the form of 
government and other variables (democracy, stability etc.) (Zaznaev, 2014b). In particular, it makes is possible to 
determine the relationship between the form of government and the consolidation of democracy, i.e. to verify empirically 
J. Linz’s (1990) hypothesis on the “perils” of presidentialism and assess the arguments of his opponents. 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
 
There are a lot of the difficulties, I mentioned, in the measurement of presidential power and the measurement of other 
components of the legislative-executive relations. But this method has gradually offered a perspective on the direction 
taken in political science. 
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